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ARTIFICIAL ENHANCEMENT:
LIMITING ENHANCED DAMAGES AWARDS
FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
ZACHERY D. OLAH*
When the Supreme Court decided Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse
Electronics, Inc., it completely changed the status of willfulness and enhanced
damages in patent law. The Court overruled the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit’s long-standing Seagate test in favor of the more flexible
Read standard without providing any guidance to the lower courts. District
courts were left with broad discretion to award enhanced damages based on the
nine Read factors. This decision led to confusion among the lower courts and
inconsistent application of the law on patent damages, as evidenced by the cases
discussed in this Comment.
This Comment argues, based on trends in district court decisions post-Halo,
that the Supreme Court should have provided more guidance to the district
courts regarding how to properly and consistently apply the Read factors to
enhanced damages analysis. This Comment proposes limitations to the Read
factors aimed to guide district courts. It then reapplies these limitations to
several district court cases to show that consistent application of the factors could
still punish the “wanton and malicious pirate” that the Supreme Court was so
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worried about in Halo, while ensuring that enhanced damages are only used
in rare cases. The proposed limitations also ensure that patent law does not
discourage inventors from engaging in the innovative process for fear of awards
of enhanced damages against them. In an area of the law where damages often
reach into the hundreds of millions, it is important that damages statutes only
apply to the more egregious cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is one of the few areas of law where damages regularly
extend into the hundreds of millions of dollars. A study by the
University of Houston Law Center analyzing large patent infringement
damage awards reported twenty cases where the court granted over
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130 million dollars in damages.1 The study also reports four cases
where the damages reached over one billion dollars.2 This data is
particularly troubling because it exists in an area of law thought to
balance disclosure of information with promotion of innovation.3 One
of the reasons patent infringement damages have the ability to reach
such high sums is because the Patent Act includes a provision that gives
district court judges the discretion to multiply the damage award by up
to three times.4 Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Halo
Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Halo),5 it was nearly impossible
to get a district court to award treble damages or enhanced damages.6
This Comment argues that, although the majority opinion in Halo set
an important precedent, the Court failed to limit the discretion of
district court judges to enhance damages in patent infringement cases.
Further, the Court proposes limitations on a judge’s discretion based on
common district court trends aimed to reach a better balance between
disclosure and promoting innovation. In its opinion, the Court could
have created guidelines for the district courts to follow by simply placing
a few limitations on the hearing of patent infringement cases.
Part I of this Comment presents some history about the development of
enhanced damages in patent law by walking through the different versions
of the Patent Act and discussing how the damages provision changed to more
broadly or more narrowly incorporate enhanced damages. Part I then
discusses recent cases that changed how courts interpret the damages
provision of the latest Patent Act. It concludes by explaining the current state
of enhanced damages and the factors considered by courts when presented
with a question of whether to actually enhance damages.

1. See Ranking of the Largest Adjudicated Patent Damages Awards in the United States
Between 2005 and 2012 (in Million U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/257208/ranking-of-the-largest-patent-damages-awards-in-the-us (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018). This website visually represents the data compiled in a study by the University
of Houston Law Center. It shows how often patent damages reach into the hundreds of
millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars regardless of whether damages are trebled.
2. See id. (listing four different patent infringement cases where the damages
reached over one billion dollars).
3. See FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy, Executive Summary, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 861, 862 (2004) (discussing the balance
between promoting innovation and disclosing information sought through patent law).
4. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
5. 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932–33 (2016).
6. See Samuel Chase Means, Note, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent
Law’s Willful Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999,
1999–2000 (2013) (stating that treble damages are “almost impossible to obtain”).
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Part II analyzes several of the first district court cases, some of which have
been subsequently vacated or reversed, addressing enhanced damages postHalo.7 This Part looks to four of the most commonly analyzed factors that
seem to sway decisions for or against enhancement. Further, it identifies
some trends and facts that district courts look to when trying to determine
whether a factor weighs for or against enhancement.
Part III offers four specific limitations that the Court could have
enacted in its Halo opinion to provide guidelines to the district courts
while limiting discretion in awarding enhanced damages. Part III also
reapplies these limitations to some of the cases discussed in Part II in
an attempt to show that the limitations effectively allow judges to
punish the most willful infringers while preventing judges from
enhancing damages in cases where the willfulness of the defendant is
questionable. Part III concludes by discussing the policy implications
of the Halo decision as it stands, and how the proposed limitations
would help strike a more even balance between disclosing information
and promoting scientific innovation.
Finally, this Comment briefly concludes by arguing that the Court
failed to properly limit the district courts’ discretion to enhance
damages for patent infringement, and that the proposed limitations
effectively accomplish that goal.
I. DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW
A. Development of the Damages Provisions
Each iteration of the Patent Act contained at least one section
dedicated solely to addressing how courts should deal with damages in
infringement suits. These sections included provisions addressing two
types of damages: compensatory damages8 and enhanced damages.
Enhanced damages first appeared in the Patent Act of 1793.9 In a case

7. It is important to recognize that some of the district court cases discussed in this
Comment have been vacated or overturned, and this Comment does not attempt to use them
as precedent. This trend on appeal further highlights the district courts’ immediate need for
guidance on how to apply the Read factors. See generally Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid,
Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL 5674713 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016), vacated sub nom. Dominion Energy,
Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am.
Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-CV-02061-H-BGS, 2016 WL 4377096 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
8. Although a discussion of compensatory damages follows, an in-depth analysis of
the development of compensatory damage models is beyond the scope of this Comment.
9. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11 § 5, 2 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836).
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where the court found infringement, the Patent Act called for damages
“at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee ha[d]
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said
invention.”10 By 1836, the language changed to limit damage awards
to treble damages and made such an enhanced award discretionary.11
Congress changed the language of the Patent Act’s damages provisions
a number of times before adopting the current language in 1952.12
The current Patent Act calls for “damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court.”13 The Patent Act of 1952 also bestows upon
the courts the ability to “increase the damages up to three times the amount”
awarded.14 Noticeably, no version of the Patent Act has provided guidance
on how to actually calculate these damages. Thus, the development of
calculation models for damages has been left to the discretion of the courts.
1.

Compensatory Damages
Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, when a court reaches a conclusion of
infringement, the damages awarded must be adequate to compensate the
patentee for the defendant’s infringement.15 Therefore, to adequately
compensate the patentee for the infringement, a court can award what are
known as lost profit damages,16 or, at the very least, a reasonable royalty.17
a. Lost Profits
When a court grants damages based on lost profits, it bases its
evaluation on how much the patentee would have made “but for” the
10. Id.
11. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357 § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (“[I]t shall be in the power of
the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as
the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount
thereof . . . .”).
12. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Courts determine lost profit damages by attempting to calculate how much
money the patent owner lost because of the infringement. It does not take into
account the profits made by the infringing party. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF
PATENTS 890 (4th ed. 2017).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 284. To determine what a “reasonable royalty” might be, courts
often look to established royalties with similar technologies; however, when one does
not exist, the court will analyze what a hypothetical negotiation would result in
between a willing buyer and willing seller. See NARD, supra note 16, at 913.
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infringement.18 This calculation does not account for how much
money the infringer actually made, and it is not automatically granted.
The legal framework for analyzing lost profit calculations is defined
by the decision in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works (Panduit).19
The Panduit court created the following conjunctive four-factor test,
which must be satisfied by the patentee to recover lost profit damages
in an infringement case:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner
must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of
the profit he would have made.20

Courts have also applied notions of “foreseeability” in deciding when
to award compensatory damages to ensure that a potential infringer is
only liable when the consequences of its actions are not too
attenuated.21 Although foreseeability is often analyzed under a flexible
framework, it is easier to prove when an infringing product is an obvious
competitor to the patented good or service.22 When the patentee
cannot prove “but for” causation, and subsequently the patentee cannot
recover lost profits, the patentee is entitled to a reasonable royalty.
b. Reasonable Royalty
Section 284 states that in every finding of infringement, the patentee
shall be entitled to at least a reasonable royalty.23 This creates a
damages floor that no award may fall below. Studies show that
reasonable royalty damages are the most frequent damages awarded in
patent infringement cases.24 When analyzing what a reasonable royalty
might be, courts will look to the exhaustive list of factors found in

18. See NARD, supra note 16, at 890, 892 (indicating that Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reiterates the “but for” test needed to establish the
amount of the profits lost by the patentee).
19. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546 (stating that foreseeability tests “have been
judicial tools used to limit legal responsibility for the consequences of one’s conduct
that are too remote to justify compensation”).
22. Id.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
24. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Patent Litigation Study 6 (2018), https://www.pwc.
com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2018-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.

2018]

ARTIFICIAL ENHANCEMENT

311

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.25 Although none of the fifteen
factors are dispositive, some are used more often than others to

25. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The exhaustive list of fifteen factors
used to analyze what constitutes a reasonable royalty follows:
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in
suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
(2) The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to
the patent in suit.
(3) The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
(4) The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his
patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
(5) The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business;
or whether they are inventor and promoter.
(6) The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
(7) The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
(8) The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
(9) The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
(10) The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
(11) The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
(12) The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in
the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
(13) The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention
as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
(14) The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
(15) The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a
business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular
article embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to pay as
a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would
have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Id.
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establish a reasonable royalty; specifically, the established royalty of the
patented invention and the royalty rates paid by the infringer for
similar products.26 Using these two factors raises two questions:
(1) what is an “established” royalty?; and (2) how else can a party prove
what a reasonable royalty is between two parties that have not
negotiated?27
Effectively analyzing and answering the questions above is beyond
the scope of this Comment, but it is important to note that in the
absence of evidence of negotiations between two parties to a suit,
courts will consider what a hypothetical negotiation would look like
between the two parties.28 Such a hypothetical negotiation is created
between two hypothetical parties, often referred to as a “willing licensor”
and a “willing licensee.”29 Such analysis is not performed in a vacuum;
in fact, it attempts to compensate for a variety of market factors like
bargaining strength between the parties and demand for the product.30
Reasonable royalty damages have proven to be an effective floor on
infringement damages. Despite sometimes being difficult to calculate,
reasonable royalties are useful in achieving the ultimate goal of
damages—making the patentee whole.31
2.

Enhanced (Treble) Damages
As the Patent Act currently stands, § 284 grants discretion to district
court judges to enhance any damages award made by the jury.32 While
such a provision seems likely to lead to massive damage awards, “[i]t is
well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful
infringement or bad faith.”33 Although there is some debate as to

26. See Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 612 F.2d 1353, 1358 (3d Cir.
1980) (analyzing reasonable royalty damages, paying particularly close attention to the
first and second Georgia-Pacific Corp. factors).
27. NARD, supra note 16, at 913.
28. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“The second, more common approach, called the hypothetical negotiation or the
‘willing licensor-willing licensee’ approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement
just before infringement began.”).
29. Id.
30. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1121.
31. For an in-depth look at each factor used to analyze lost profits and reasonable
royalty damages, see Nancy J. Linck & Barry P. Golob, Patent Damages: The Basics, 34 IDEA
13, 21–25 (1994) (discussing the different steps of analysis for compensatory damages).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
33. Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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whether enhanced damages effectively deter willful infringers, it has
long been used by district court judges to increase damage awards in
cases where the defendant acted maliciously.34
a. The Federal Circuit’s Seagate Test
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued
its decision in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc. (Read),35 laying the foundation for
enhanced damages analysis. This decision created a nine-factor test36 for
district courts to rely on when analyzing enhanced damages.37 This ninefactor test served as a prominent analytical tool in enhanced damages
jurisprudence for over a decade, until its temporary demise.
In 2007, the Federal Circuit decided In re Seagate Tech., LLC
(Seagate),38 in which it implemented a two-part test.39 The court wanted
to use this new test to analyze whether to award enhanced damages
based on the level of willfulness present in the infringement by the
infringing party.40 The two prongs were based on an “objective
willfulness analysis” and a “subjective analysis” of the alleged infringer’s
knowledge of his or her infringement.41 This decision came in the
wake of years of criticism of how the courts handled willful infringers.42
i.

First Prong: Objective Willfulness

Under Seagate, for a judge or jury to award enhanced damages, the
patentee had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.”43 Specifically, the Federal Circuit used this
prong to abandon the “affirmative duty of care” requirement, which

34. See Means, supra note 6, at 2035–39.
35. 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (developing a nine-factor test for determining
when to enhance damages in infringement suits).
36. See infra Section II.A.2.b.
37. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826–27.
38. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
39. Id. at 1370–71.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1371.
42. Many proponents of enhanced damages found that the standard was too
flexible and rarely led to enhancement in cases which deserved it. Dmitry Karshtedt,
Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1461 (2018).
43. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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required an alleged infringer to search for the existence of a patent and
often seek legal advice on the validity of that patent.44
Arguments for willful infringement, and thus, enhancement of
damages, often failed on this prong. An empirical study of willfulness
litigation post-Seagate revealed that cases where the alleged infringer
raised “legitimate” or “substantial” defenses to infringement often
resulted in decisions of “no willfulness.”45 As later stated by the Supreme
Court in Halo,46 this prong made “dispositive the ability of the infringer
to muster a reasonable . . . defense at the infringement trial. . . . [E]ven
if he did not act on the basis of the defense or was even aware of it.”47
ii. Second Prong: Subjective Willfulness
The second prong of analysis under Seagate required subjective
analysis of the alleged infringers knowledge or state of mind as a
question of fact; specifically, whether the risk of infringement “was
either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the
accused infringer.”48 This prong aimed to help the court focus on the
actual behavior of the alleged infringer.49 Here, the patentee could
argue factual matters as to how the infringer acted, or failed to act, with
respect to the existence of the patent.
This factual analysis would never be reached, however, if the
infringer successfully defended against the objective willfulness prong
as discussed above. Successful legal defenses essentially mooted any
factual evidence showing the egregious misconduct of the infringer
offered by the patentee.50
Academics and practitioners were interested in the Seagate decision
because they anticipated that it would lead to fewer willfulness
44. Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1197 (2008) (“[Seagate] made clear that there is no affirmative
duty on the part of an exploiting firm to search for a patent, nor any duty to search for
advice from counsel on the validity of a patent that is uncovered if a search is done.”).
45. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After
In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 452 (2012).
46. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
47. Id.
48. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
49. See Brett Williamson, Is the Seagate Test for Willful Infringement Here to Stay?,
LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2015, 10:23 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/634564 (stating
how the second prong of the Seagate test is used to analyze the infringer’s own
motivations for infringing).
50. J. Gregory Sidak, Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents,
1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 1101, 1103 (2016).
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determinations.51 However, the empirical study discussed above found
the opposite result.52 The author of the study, Professor Christopher
Seaman, stated that the result of his study “calls into question some of
the conventional wisdom regarding Seagate’s impact on willful patent
infringement.”53
In conclusion, it is clear that the two-prong test established by the
Federal Circuit in the Seagate decision highlighted the issues that were
present in enhanced damages jurisprudence. The test did not survive
because it was difficult to apply and led to unpredictable and
infrequent willfulness decisions, often letting even the “wanton and
malicious pirate”54 off of the hook for enhanced damages.55
A study of willfulness decisions immediately after the Seagate decision
further proves this point.56 In fact, only seven of the twenty-nine cases
studied resulted in a finding of willfulness under the Seagate standard.57
The study further highlights the ways that alleged infringers can avoid
a finding of willfulness, such as obtaining a competent legal opinion,
performing an independent review of patents, or simply offering
evidence of attempts to design around the patented technology.58

51. See Laura P. Masurovsky, A Radical Change in Willful Infringement Litigation,
LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2013, 1:10 PM), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/a-radicalchange-in-willful-infringement-litigation.html (discussing how the first prong of the
Seagate test leads practitioners to believe that questions of willful infringement will be
more easily disposed of at the summary judgement stage).
52. Seaman, supra note 45, at 443.
53. Id. at 471.
54. The phrase “wanton and malicious pirate” is often used to describe parties who
purposely infringe patents without offering compensation to the patent owner. See
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (describing the
“wanton and malicious pirate” as an actor who “intentionally infringes another’s
patent”); see also Brian Barnes, Note, Creating a More Certain Standard for Enhanced Patent
Damages by Requiring Egregiousness as an Element in the Section 284 Analysis, 67 DUKE L.J.
615, 636 (2017) (indicating the difficulty in discerning the egregiousness standard in
certain cases).
55. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932.
56. Kurt M. Rogers et al., Seagate: Trends over the Last 18 Months, LAW360 (Jan. 23,
2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/84435/seagate-trends-over-thelast-18-months (discussing the statistics and trends of willfulness determinations
following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Seagate).
57. See id. (including twenty-four decisions from seventeen district courts and five
decisions from the Federal Circuit).
58. Id.
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b. Enhanced Damages Under the Supreme Court’s Halo Decision
On February 23, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Halo. The petitioner in this case, Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo), claimed
that Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) willfully infringed on its patents for
electronic transformers uniquely designed to be mounted to circuit
boards.59 After Pulse received two offers to license Halo’s patents, Pulse
refused the offers and continued selling its allegedly infringing devices.60
After the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of no
willfulness, the Supreme Court granted Halo’s petition for a writ of
certiorari and subsequently vacated the decision and remanded the
case.61 The Court, along with other practitioners in the field of patent
law, wanted to use this case to revise the enhanced damages analysis in a
way that promotes innovation while punishing the “wanton and malicious
pirate.”62 In its opinion, the Court quickly noted the major issue it took
with the first prong of the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test: “The principal
problem with Seagate’s two-part test is that it requires a finding of objective
recklessness in every case before district courts may award enhanced
damages.”63 The Court further expressed its concern with the most
malicious infringers by pointing out that “[u]nder Seagate, a district court
may not even consider enhanced damages for such a pirate, unless the
court first determines that his infringement was ‘objectively’ reckless.”64
Overall, it appeared to the Court that the Seagate test “constrained a
district court’s statutory discretion to award enhanced damages.”65
The Court continued to analyze the Seagate test, expressing its
concerns with the heightened evidentiary burden placed on the
defendant.66 The Court concluded that since “Congress expressly
erected a higher standard of proof elsewhere in the Patent Act, . . . but
not in § 284,” it did not intend for a heightened standard of proof with
respect to enhanced damages.67
The Court concluded that the Seagate decision, and its accompanying
two-part test, needed to be overruled and replaced with the “egregious
59. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1930.
60. Id. at 1931.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1928, 1935.
63. Id. at 1932.
64. Id. at 1926.
65. Sidak, supra note 50, at 1104.
66. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934.
67. Id. The Court used its decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014), to further support this notion.
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infringement” standard.68 This decision left the door open as to what
lower courts should do when analyzing whether to award enhanced
damages. In general, district courts began looking back to the ninefactor Read test.69 The Read test asked the lower courts to analyze the
following nine-factors as a whole, so that none were dispositive:
(1) [W]hether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design
of another[;]
(2) [W]hether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a goodfaith belief that it was invalid or that is was not infringed[;]
(3) [T]he infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation[;]
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition[;]
(5) Closeness of the case[;]
(6) Duration of defendant’s misconduct[;]
(7) Remedial action by the defendant[;]
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm[;]
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.70

Approaching enhancement under this standard left district courts
with plenty of discretion to apply specific factors as they pleased.71 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer pointed out the need for the
Court to address limitations on the analysis as prescribed by the
statute.72 Justice Breyer recognized that enhanced damages should be
applied carefully,73 but the standard appeared to be unconstrained after

68. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935. The Court also noted that, on appeal, the
award of enhanced damages is reviewable only for abuse of discretion, tying the hands
of the Federal Circuit in most instances. Id.
69. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (developing
a nine-factor test for determining when to enhance damages in infringement suits).
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. See infra Part II (explaining that while some factors have been consistently
applied, the failure to evaluate other factors has led to inconsistent and negligent
applications of the egregious misconduct standard).
72. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1936–38 (Breyer, J., concurring) (laying out three
specific limitations on enhanced damages analysis). Justice Breyer wanted to limit the
egregious misconduct analysis in three ways. First, he wanted to clarify that “willful
misconduct” does not mean that enhanced damages may be awarded only by a showing
that the infringer knew of the patent. Id. at 1936. Second, he felt that relying on
whether the infringer sought legal counsel before infringing was an unfair
requirement due to its policy implications, specifically, stifling innovation at an early
stage. Id. Third, he wanted to ensure that enhancement never be used to compensate
because § 284 already does that. Id. at 1937.
73. Id. at 1938.
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the Court’s opinion. In sum, the district courts were left to use the ninefactor Read test to analyze questions of enhancement in cases of patent
infringement with no limitations on the courts’ discretion to use the test.
II. INCONSISTENT ENHANCED DAMAGES ANALYSIS AT THE DISTRICT
COURTS POST-HALO
Soon after Halo, district courts across the country began applying the
Read test in varying and unrestrained fashion. Although, as expected,
none of the factors alone seem to be dispositive, the courts generally
rely on many of the same factors to grant enhancement. Specifically,
lower courts focus on the following factors: evidence of copying;
whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and formed
a good faith belief of invalidity or non-infringement; closeness of the
case; and attempts to conceal the misconduct.74 Although some factors
have seen consistent application, other factors have not received
similarly consistent analysis.75 This void has led to exactly what Justice
Breyer feared—inconsistent and negligent applications of the
egregious misconduct standard.76 The cases analyzed in the following
sections show that, although enhanced damages are still infrequently
awarded, the standard for enhancement and the level of enhancement
is a result of inconsistent analysis by the district courts.77

74. See generally Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL
5674713, at *21–23 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (analyzing factors one, two, and nine to
award enhancement), vacated sub nom. Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725
F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 755, 763–64 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (analyzing factors one and
two to establish a finding of enhancement); Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co.,
Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257–58 (D. Mass. 2016) (analyzing factors two and nine to
reject an enhancement argument); Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. 5:13-CV02024-RMW, 2016 WL 4427490, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (analyzing factor five
to deny an enhancement argument).
75. See infra Section III.A (discussing inconsistencies in the application of the first
Read factor); see also infra Section III.B (analyzing inconsistencies in the application of
the second Read factor).
76. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1937.
77. Only four of the nine Read factors are analyzed in this Comment. These are
four of the most commonly discussed factors in court opinions. Although other factors
may be more heavily relied on in specific cases, an analysis of the Supreme Court’s
failure to limit them is beyond the scope of this Comment.

2018]

ARTIFICIAL ENHANCEMENT

319

A. Factor One: Evidence of Copying
One frequently considered factor is the first factor of the Read test:
evidence of copying. District courts have inconsistently used this factor
to reach both decisions of enhancement and no enhancement in cases
with similar facts. For example, the court in Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom
Grid, Inc. (Dominion)78 found that the evidence of copying factor
weighed in favor of the plaintiff. In an infringement case about “an
aspect of computer software which helps manage and conserve voltage
for electric utilities delivering power to our homes, hospitals and
businesses,” the parties asked the court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to consider enhanced damages.79 Here, the accused
infringer saw the patentee’s invention at a trade show.80 Nine months
later, the defendant first unveiled the infringing product.81 The court
did not find any evidence that the defendant actually obtained the
patented device, copied the device, or other “smoking gun” activities.82
With the limited evidence of willful infringement, the court held that
it “[did] not require evidence of blatant copying.”83 The court stated
that, since the defendant “had the means and opportunity to copy” the
patented invention, the court could “infer” that the defendant
copied.84 Without any substantive evidence of copying, the court
speculatively relied on trite facts to conclude that the defendant was
“reckless.”85 For a factor specifically described as “evidence of
copying,” the court questionably concluded that this factor had been
satisfied through speculation without sound evidence.86
In Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
(Imperium IP ),87 a case about infringement of digital image sensors, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas analyzed the evidence of
copying factor. In Imperium IP, the plaintiff provided evidence, through
testimony, that the defendant specifically sought information about the

78. Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *18.
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *21.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (inferring that the defendant copied the patented invention because it
was “at least reckless” in its handling of the situation).
87. Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d
755 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
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patented product.88 The testimony uncovered evidence that the
defendant asked for details about how the plaintiff made its cameras in
addition to specific information “about anti-flicker and flash technology,
requested source code, and, in regard to higher megapixel cameras,
control registers, signals, and the circuitry for the interface.”89 Similar
to Dominion, the court decided that this evidence weighed in favor of the
plaintiff’s argument supporting a finding of copying.90 The court did
not have to speculate whether the defendant actually copied the product
because it was provided with sound evidence of such copying.91 Unlike
the plaintiff in Dominion, the plaintiff here could actually point to the
defendant’s actions to prove blatant copying.92
Conversely, in WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,93 the analysis with respect to
evidence of copying low emission generator patents is questionable.
The District Court of Massachusetts found that the evidence of copying
factor supported a fifty percent enhancement; and this decision was
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, post-Halo.94 The defendant here
allegedly infringed the patent after being exposed to the novel
technology at a trade show.95 Like Dominion, where the alleged
infringer saw the patented technology at a trade show, the facts of this
case fail to provide any evidence of blatant copying, allowing the court
to base its decision simply on the fact that the defendant attended a
trade show where the patent owner displayed the patented
technology.96 Again, the court speculated as to whether the defendant
copied anything from the patented product instead of relying on
actual evidence of copying.97 This case further highlights post-Halo
issues because the Federal Circuit could not “abuse its discretion” and
was thus forced to affirm the district court’s decision.98 This is a
problem because the Federal Circuit must often affirm factual findings
of the lower courts, and it can hardly do any factually corrective work
88. Id. at 763.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (highlighting the multiple examples of the defendant’s actions to prove
actual exposure to the patents at issue).
93. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL 585854 (D. Mass. Feb.
12, 2014), aff’d, 829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
94. Id. at *8.
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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if the district court misapplies the Read factors.99 The inconsistency in
the analysis of this factor at the district courts, for example, shows that
the lower courts could benefit from review by the Federal Circuit
guiding how to apply each factor.100
Overall, the district courts’ analyses of factor one, evidence of
copying, is inconsistent and questionable. The analyses made by the
courts in the cases above show that vastly different facts can lead to
similar decisions, even without hard evidence of actual copying. Had
the Supreme Court placed a limitation on the evidence of copying
factor, the district courts may have been able to come to more
consistent and reasonable decisions when weighing the factor.101 It is
troubling that district courts are inclined to find evidence of copying
while failing to require the plaintiff to find evidence proving that the
defendants willfully copied.
B. Factor Two: Investigating the Scope of the Patent
Another often analyzed Read factor is whether the infringer
investigated the scope of the patent, leading to “a good-faith belief that
the patent was invalid or that it was not infringed.”102 Although the
cases discussed below have different outcomes with respect to
enhanced damages, the courts in each case comment on a similar
issue: whether the infringer sought professional legal help.103
99. See Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance
and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 298–99 (2002) (explaining the impact of the
“clearly erroneous” standard on the Federal Circuit’s ability to overturn the district
court’s finding of fact).
100. See WBIP, LLC, 829 F.3d at 1325 (acknowledging the district court’s use of the
Read factors, as a whole, for damage enhancement analysis without discussing the lower
court’s analysis of each factor on its own).
101. See infra Section III.A.
102. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
103. See Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL 5674713, at
*22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (enhancing damages after recognizing the infringer’s
failure to seek professionals to review patents), vacated sub nom. Dominion Energy, Inc.
v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Imperium IP Holdings
(Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d 755, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2016)
(granting enhancement when the infringer failed to investigate the scope of the
patents after a failed negotiation between the parties); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys.,
No. 13-CV-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (denying
enhancement when the plaintiff could not prove that the infringer had actual
knowledge of the patent), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-CV-02061-H-BGS,
2016 WL 4377096, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (denying enhancement when the
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The court in Dominion addresses the issue of investigating the scope
of the patents.104 In a short, one paragraph discussion, the court
concluded that the infringer did not prove it had a good faith belief
that it did not infringe.105 Without performing much legal analysis, it
is clear that one statement stands out to explain how the court reached
this conclusion: “Alstom admits not having someone with the specific
skill in the art of reading patent claims reviewing Dominion’s
patent.”106 The court glanced over some of the arguments made by the
infringer; for instance, the argument that the infringer believed it did
not infringe because the patent was directed to “a specific measurement
way to do [conservation voltage reduction], and [the infringer used] a
model-based system, not direct measurement system.”107 However, based
on the court’s language, the failure of the infringer to seek legal help to
investigate the patents weighed in favor of the plaintiff.108
Similarly, the court granted enhanced damages in Imperium IP.109
Although the court in this case never expressly discussed the infringers
failure to seek legal counsel, it makes a blanket statement that the
infringer “never undertook any serious investigation to form a goodfaith belief as to non-infringement or invalidity.”110 The infringer in
Imperium IP had previously made attempts to purchase the patents that
it allegedly infringed upon.111 The court noted that because of this fact,
the deep knowledge of the patents should have been enough to make
the infringer perform some sort of scope investigation.112 Although the
court failed to explicitly state what the infringer could have actually
done to tip this element in its favor, it is safe to assume, based on similar
analysis by other district courts, that this court would have seriously

scope of the claims was unclear), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257–58 (D. Mass.
2016) (denying enhancement when the infringer offered proof that it sought legal
advice from two separate law firms).
104. Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *22.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (“Alstom’s belief it did not infringe because the AMI functionality within
the LVM module is housed in the ‘model-based system’ DMS is based entirely on the
opinion of people without expertise in reading patent claims.”).
109. Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d
755, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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considered the opinions of legal counsel as a sound investigation of the
scope of the patents, had the infringer offered that evidence.113
Conversely, courts have denied enhancement in cases that have
similar facts to cases in which enhancement was awarded. For
example, in Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems (Finjan),114 the District
Court for the Northern District of California addressed a case involving
infringement of patents directed toward internet security systems. The
court made it clear that one fact was outcome determinative in Finjan
with respect to the second Read factor: whether the infringer had
knowledge of the patent.115 Here the court noted that “Finjan has not
provided sufficient evidence to show Blue Coat knew of the specific
patents-in-suit prior to this lawsuit.”116 Thus, in addition to looking at
whether the infringer sought legal advice, it is now clear that district
courts also consider the infringer’s knowledge of the patents.117 The
court in Finjan did not address the issue of whether the infringer
sought legal help; however, this appears to be the case because it did
not want to put the burden on an infringer that never actually knew of
a patent’s existence.118
The District Court for the Southern District of California also
reached a decision of no enhancement after analyzing the knowledge
of the infringer in Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical
Ceramics Corp. (Presidio).119 The court here also discussed the issue of
knowledge, concluding that the infringer had enough knowledge of
the patents to move forward with its analysis.120 The court ultimately
concluded that the infringer formed a good faith belief of noninfringement or invalidity based on the result of the reexamination
proceedings on the patent.121 In the reexamination proceedings filed

113. See Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257–58 (D. Mass. 2016).
114. No. 13-CV-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-CV-02061-HBGS, 2016 WL 4377096, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
120. Id.
121. Presidio, 2016 WL 4377096, at *22. In Presidio, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) engaged in an ex parte reexamination of the patent at
issue. In general, reexamination proceedings attempt to give the USPTO a chance to
correct any mistakes made in granting the patent in the first place. Chris Rourk &
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by the infringer, the plaintiff was forced to drastically narrow the claims
of the patent in question.122 This fact led the court to categorize this
case as one that presented “unique circumstances” surrounding the
infringers knowledge, and the court found that factor two weighed in
favor of denying a motion for enhancement.123
Finally, the District Court of Massachusetts addressed the second
Read factor in Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co.124
Here, the district court refused to enhance damages relying heavily on
the infringer’s good faith belief of non-infringement.125 The court
unquestionably charged the infringer with knowledge of the patents,
and highlighted its conduct after receiving knowledge of the patents.126
The court, in weighing the second factor, focused its attention on the
infringer seeking the legal advice of two separate law firms in addition
to the advice of a third party testing company.127 Based on the opinions
of both law firms and the testing company, the infringer had two sound
reasons for believing that it did not infringe on the patent at issue.128
Relying on evidence of the infringer’s good faith belief that it did not
infringe based on the opinions of legal professionals, the court denied
a motion to enhance damages.129
After analyzing these district court cases, it is clear that the courts pay
particularly close attention to two groups of facts when analyzing the
second Read factor: (1) the infringer’s knowledge of the patent; and
(2) whether the infringer sought legal advice regarding the validity and
scope of the patent.130 Although the courts’ analyses with respect to
Blake Dietrich, Ex Parte Re-Exam—An Overlooked Way to Challenge Patents, LAW360 (Apr.
28, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/778917/ex-parte-re-exam-anoverlooked-way-to-challenge-patents. That being said, a patent owner or a third party
may request a reexamination any time after the patent issues by bringing a piece of
prior art to the attention of the USPTO that raises a substantial question about the
original patentability of the invention. Id. Ex parte reexaminations, similar to the one
in Presidio, usually involve only the patent owner and the USPTO and may result in a
finding of a narrow scope of protection or invalidity. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *21.
124. 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257–58 (D. Mass. 2016).
125. Id. at 258.
126. Id. at 257.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 258.
130. See Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL 5674713, at
*22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (granting enhancement), vacated sub nom. Dominion
Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Trs. of Bos. Univ.,
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knowledge of the patent leads to expected results, the same cannot be
said about whether the infringer sought legal advice. Although it is
unclear how the Court wanted lower courts to analyze egregiousness, for
the legal and policy reasons discussed later in this Comment, it is hard
to imagine that the Court meant to impose the burden of seeking legal
counsel so early in the innovative process.131 Innovation is an arduous
and expensive process to begin with,132 and the way courts have analyzed
the second Read factor may complicate the process further. The
Supreme Court should have narrowed the focus of the good faith
analysis to prevent an implicitly required, and economically
burdensome, legal investigation. There are other, more reasonable,
ways for courts to analyze whether the infringer had a good faith belief
that the patent was invalid or that the infringer did not infringe.133
C. Factor Five: Closeness of the Case
The fifth factor of the Read test, the closeness of the case, both
overlaps with the second factor and shows that the Seagate objective
reasonableness standard is relevant because it forces district courts to
analyze the objective beliefs of the infringer.134 The following cases
exemplify how the lower courts look to objectively reasonable defenses
when analyzing the closeness of the case.135

212 F. Supp. 3d at 257–58 (denying enhancement); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., No.
13-CV-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (denying
enhancement), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
131. See infra Part IV.
132. See generally Ross Breckenridge, The High Cost of Drugs is the Price We Pay for
Innovation, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2017/03/the-high-cost-of-drugs-is-the-price-we-pay-for-innovation (discussing the rise
in medicine prices and how the high cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical field
plays a role in those prices).
133. Discussing how the courts should analyze the second Read factor is beyond the
scope of this Comment. The conclusion to be drawn is that the Supreme Court should
have placed limitations on this factor so that the decision of the lower courts does not
rest on whether the infringer sought legal advice before litigation occurred.
134. Donald Steinberg et al., 4 Factors Influencing Enhanced Damages After
Halo, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/876993/4factors-influencing-enhanced-damages-after-halo.
135. See Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-020240-RMW, 2016 WL
4427490, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (denying enhancement where the court
found the question of infringement to be a close case); Enplas Display Device Corp. v.
Seoul Semiconductor Co., No. 13-CV-05038 NC, 2016 WL 4208236, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2016) (denying enhancement despite the jury’s finding of willfulness because
the case was a close call).
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In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,136 one of the first willfulness
cases to reach the Federal Circuit on appeal, the Federal Circuit echoed
the notion that courts must still analyze objective reasonableness.137
Although the Federal Circuit did not analyze the nine Read factors, the
lower courts’ previous use of the objective reasonableness standard to
decide closeness of the case could mean that this standard will play a
significant role in similar inquiries in the future.138
The District Court for the Northern District of California analyzed
the fifth Read factor in detail in Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc.139 In
this case, the infringer failed to raise an infringement defense at trial
and even “stipulated to the infringement of certain claims”; however,
the court denied a motion for enhancement based heavily of the fifth
Read factor.140 The court specifically stated that the plaintiff’s
arguments in favor of enhancement “overlook[] the closeness of the
infringement issues in this case.”141 In fact, the court here pointed to
a particular claim of the patent in question to support this decision:
“Moreover, this court ruled on summary judgment that claim 24 of
[the patent] was not infringed by products with F5’s Hotfixes
applied.”142 In conclusion, the court refused to enhance damages
when the infringer raised reasonable arguments that led to a tough
decision, or a decision in the alleged infringer’s favor, on the question
of infringement of the claims at issue.143
Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of California
in Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co. (Enplas),144 a case
dealing with patents for low profile lighting apparatuses, again denied
a motion for enhanced damages based on the closeness of the case.145
In Enplas, the jury found that the infringer was willful in its
infringement, but the court used its discretion to deny enhancement
to the plaintiff.146 After laying out the facts and factors that weighed in
136. 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (stating that the objective reasonableness
standard is still relevant to the willfulness analysis).
137. Id. at 1363.
138. Id. at 1362–63.
139. No. 5:13-CV-020240-RMW, 2016 WL 4427490, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016).
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *15.
144. No. 13-cv-05038 NC, 2016 WL 4208236, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016).
145. Id. at *8.
146. Id.
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favor of enhancement, the court quickly pointed to the closeness of
the case as a factor that cut the other way: “On the other hand, the case
was hard fought and a close call.”147 Again, the court, in its determination
that the case was close, pointed to the objective reasonableness of the
invalidity defenses raised by the infringer at trial.148
In sum, these cases illustrate how lower courts analyze the fifth Read
factor, tracing the arguments back to the objective reasonableness
prong of the Seagate test.149 It appears that the lower courts are using
this factor to allow reasonable defenses to continue to be considered
in the analysis, without making them dispositive. Although the
Supreme Court did not place any limitations on the fifth factor, courts
have effectively analyzed this factor as a limited version of the
preexisting objective reasonableness test.
D. Factor Nine: Attempts to Conceal Misconduct
The final factor that district courts focus on is factor nine: attempts
to conceal the willful misconduct by the infringing party. As expected,
this factor commonly weighs in favor of enhancement when found.150
In fact, until at least January 2017, every court that found concealment
awarded enhanced damages, while every denial of a motion for
enhancement involved no such finding of concealment.151
First, turning back to Dominion, the infringer in the case took
affirmative steps to conceal a large portion of evidence that confirmed
its willful conduct with a third party.152 The infringer’s concealing
conduct is especially troubling in this case because the plaintiff
attempted to obtain the information months before filing suit.153 After
essentially ignoring the plaintiff’s requests for information regarding
the infringing product, the plaintiff later discovered the information it
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra Section I.A.2.a.i (detailing the objective willfulness prong established
in Seagate).
150. See, e.g., Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL 5674713,
at *21, *24 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (granting enhancement after finding that the
infringer refused to offer information about the infringement), vacated sub nom.
Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); PPC
Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, No. 5:11-cv-761, 2016 WL
6537977, at *27–28 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2016) (granting enhancement after finding that
the infringer secretly used the patented technology under a disguised older product).
151. See Steinberg et al., supra note 134.
152. Dominion, 2016 WL 5674713, at *24.
153. Id. at *23–24.
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sought through third party discovery.154 It was not until this point that
the plaintiff understood the true depth of the infringement.155 The
court emphatically relied on the infringer’s concealment to reach a
finding of enhancement: “[The infringer’s] conduct in secretly
proceeding with [the third party] . . . is enough to find this factor
weighs in favor of some measure of enhanced damages.”156 This is
exactly the type of conduct the Supreme Court hoped to deter with its
egregious misconduct test, and thus, it is no surprise that the lower
court found that the concealment weighed in favor of enhancement.157
Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of New York
reached a finding of concealment and enhanced damages in PPC
Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC (PPC
Broadband).158 The questionable conduct by the infringer included
adding new “invisible” features to its products that turned out to be
infringing the patent in question.159 The defendant attempted to mask its
infringement by using “the same series and model number, same outward
appearance, and same catalogue and marketing materials” for the new
version of its product incorporating the plaintiff’s patented technology.160
In addition to this conduct, the infringer never sent prototypes or
drawings to the patentee, further supporting a finding of concealment.161
Finally, the district court in Trustees of Boston University analyzed the
ninth Read factor and came to a conclusion of no concealment.162
Unlike the infringer in PPC Broadband, the infringer here provided the
patentee with samples of the accused product for the patentee to
analyze.163 On this fact, the court said that “[p]roviding an accuser
with the means to determine infringement, in the form of product
samples, is not an action to conceal infringement.”164 Although the
patentee argued that the infringer concealed its infringement by
“instructing its lawyers only to analyze the first aluminum nitride layer

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at *24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *25.
No. 5:11-cv-761, 2016 WL 6537977, at *12, *34 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2016).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257 (D. Mass. 2016).
Id.
Id.
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and not the gallium nitride layers above it,” the court credited the
infringer’s testimony explaining why it did so.165
To summarize, lower courts use the ninth Read factor to better
analyze and understand the infringer’s conduct before and during
litigation. When concealment is found, courts often enhance
damages.166 When an infringer is faced with proving that it did not
conceal evidence of its infringement, case law provides that the most
helpful fact is proof that the accused infringer sent drawings or
samples to the patentee for review.167 Overall, it looks like lower courts
use this factor reasonably despite its apparent status as the most
outcome determinative of the Read factors.168
III. LIMITING THE “EGREGIOUS MISCONDUCT” TEST
When the Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test
for enhanced damages in Halo, the Court failed to properly limit the
district courts’ discretion in deciding whether to enhance damages.169
The district courts were left with unfettered discretion to analyze the
nine factors put forth in Read to determine when to enhance damages
in patent infringement cases. This unbound discretion led to inconsistent
and questionable applications of the Read test among the district courts,
which could have been avoided had the Supreme Court included some
much-needed guidance in its opinion.170 This part of the Comment
proposes several guidelines and limitations to the Read factors that
have proven to be the most inconsistently applied. The proposed
guidelines and limitations are derived from the patterns of legal
analysis by district courts as discussed in Part II.
A. Placing Limitations on the Read Factors
Some of the most commonly analyzed Read factors at the district
court level lead to troubling or inconsistent weighing of the nine

165. Id.
166. See Steinberg et al., supra note 134.
167. See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ., 212 F. Supp. 3d at 257.
168. None of the other commonly analyzed Read factors are as strongly correlated
with the court granting—or not granting—enhancement.
169. See supra Section I.A.2.b (discussing the tremendous amount of discretion left
to lower courts following the Halo decision).
170. See supra Part II (connecting the confusion of lower courts to the concerns
voiced by Justice Breyer in his Halo concurrence).
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factors, as shown above.171 When the Supreme Court struck down the
Federal Circuit’s Seagate test in Halo,172 it should have used the
opportunity to explicitly limit how lower courts should analyze
questions of willfulness and enhanced damages. Although the Court’s
reasoning for striking down the Seagate test is legitimate,173 it should
have more seriously considered how the district courts would use this
new standard.174 Some of Justice Breyer’s proposed limitations in his
concurring opinion would limit discretion; however, he failed to
seriously analyze the factors of the Read test,175 the test that lower courts
would obviously rely on when analyzing enhanced damages.
The following section proposes limitations on four of the commonly
used Read factors to restrain the district courts’ discretion in enhancing
damages. Such limitations, had they been made by the Supreme
Court, would be legally grounded in the Court’s ability to interpret the
law,176 and would promote the policy underpinnings of patent law to
reward invention while promoting innovative work.177
The first proposed limitation to the Read test is on the first factor.
When analyzing factor one, the only way this can weigh in favor of
enhancement is if actual evidence of copying exists. Evidence cannot
be inferred. As seen in two of the cases analyzed above, lower courts
use their discretion to allow this factor to weigh in favor of
enhancement when the only “proof” of copying comes from mere
speculation.178 Allowing such analysis seems contradictory when the
171. See id. (describing the inconsistent analysis of the Read factors by lower courts
following the Halo decision).
172. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933–34 (2016).
173. Id. at 1931.
174. See id. at 1936–38 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the need to limit district
courts’ discretion in awarding enhanced damages).
175. Id. (discussing various justifications for limiting district court discretion but
offering no clear guidance on Read factor analysis).
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
177. The United States Constitution says that Congress may grant inventors limited
exclusive rights to their inventions “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
178. See Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-224, 2016 WL 5674713, at
*20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (refusing to enhance damages with “only an inference of
copying present”), vacated sub nom. Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F.
App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11-10374-NMG, 2014 WL
585854, at *7 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (acknowledging the lack of “smoking gun”
evidence of copying as persuasive in limiting the damages award). In both cases, the
district courts enhanced damages when the only evidence of copying was that the
infringer was exposed to the patented invention at a trade show.
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factor is explicitly defined as “whether the infringer deliberately
copied the ideas or design of another.”179 The Supreme Court should
have addressed this factor to ensure that lower courts would not rely
on speculation to hold an infringer liable for enhanced damages on
top of the compensatory damages award.
The second proposed limitation is on the second Read factor. When
analyzing factor two, courts must rely on the infringing parties’
knowledge of the patents and their own attempts to research the scope.
The infringer need not consult legal professionals for the factor to
weigh against enhancement. However, if the party seeks legal advice,
this should weigh against enhancement. Based on the decisions in
Finjan and Presidio, it appears that the district courts have effectively
applied the knowledge portion of this limitation.180 Although patent
infringement is a strict liability offense, infringers should never receive
punitive damages for infringing upon a patent that it did not know
about. Further, as in Presidio, when the scope of the claims in the
patent are questionable, so much so that they are narrowed in some
form of post-grant proceeding, an infringer should not be
unforgivingly punished for infringement of those claims.
Moving to the second prong of the proposed limitation for factor
two, the lower courts do not seem to be fully applying this on their
own.181 Although seeking legal counsel appears to weigh against
enhancement,182 courts still look to the infringer’s decision to seek
legal counsel when weighing factors for enhancement. Holding
innovators accountable for enhanced damages based on their failure
to seek legal counsel early in the inventive process not only does not
make sense, but also flies in the face of what patent law tries to
accomplish as a whole. What is the point of making an already arduous
179. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated by
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
180. See Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-cv-02061H-BGS, 2016 WL 4377096, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (denying enhancement
where the infringer had knowledge of the patents, but the claims of the patent were
limited in a reexamination proceeding initiated by the infringer), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-03999BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (denying enhancement where
it was clear that the infringer never knew of the patent’s existence), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
181. See Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *22 (noting that the defendant
admitted that it failed to secure expert review of the infringed patent).
182. See Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257 (D. Mass.
2016) (denying enhancement where the infringer sought legal advice from two law firms).
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and expensive process more demanding? Applying the proposed
limitation would not allow the “wanton and malicious pirate”183 that the
Supreme Court is so concerned about off of the hook. It would simply
protect the common inventor from spending more money to seek legal
help—an obviously expensive endeavor—at the early stages of invention.
The third proposed limitation is to factor five. When analyzing factor
five, if there is any objectively reasonable question as to whether there was
even infringement, courts cannot weigh this factor in favor of enhancing
damages. As noted previously, this is an effective way to resurrect a
portion of the Seagate test that strongly limited when enhanced damages
were awarded without making that portion of the test as dispositive as it
was previously.184 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly state this
proposed limitation, many lower courts are reaching decisions that abide
by the limitation.185 By adopting the proposed limitation, the Supreme
Court could have guaranteed that the objective reasonableness of an
infringer’s defense is taken into account when analyzing the fifth factor,
without making it dispositive one way or the other.
The final proposed limitation to the Read test is to factor nine. When
analyzing factor nine, courts should weigh this factor in favor of
enhancement if there is evidence that the infringer sought to deceive
the court or hide evidence of infringement. Again, although the
Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt this limitation, most courts
have effectively used this factor when analyzing the Read factors.186
Given the Supreme Court’s concern with infringers engaging in piracy,
it is understandable that when courts find concealment they often also
grant enhanced damages. Of the nine Read factors, behavior confirming
the infringer’s concealment aligns with the actions of a pirate more than
any other factor. While it is important that this factor alone is not
dispositive of any arguments against enhancement, lower courts seem
183. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (quoting
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853)).
184. See infra Section III.C (discussing how the fifth factor of the Read test demonstrates
that the Seagate objective reasonableness standard is not entirely obsolete).
185. See Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 2016 WL
4427490, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (denying enhancement in a close case);
Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., No. 13-cv-05038 NC, 2016
WL 4208236, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) (denying enhancement where the jury
found willfulness in a “hard fought” close case).
186. See, e.g., Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *22 (addressing the alleged
infringer’s “good faith belief in non-infringement”); Trs. of Bos. Univ., 212 F. Supp. 3d
at 257 (highlighting the defendant’s pre-trial attempts to determine if its product
infringed plaintiff’s patent).
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to effectively analyze the behavior of the infringer with respect to its
attempts to conceal evidence of misconduct.187
B. Applying the New Limitations to the Read Test
To demonstrate how the proposed limitations on the Read test would
function in practice, this section will apply the test to two cases
discussed in Part II: Dominion and Imperium IP. Doing so will show that
the proposed test will not change how courts may come out on the issue
of enhancement in cases involving the most willful infringers, while
ensuring that enhancement is only applied in extremely egregious cases.188
Turning first to Dominion, it appears that the proposed test could
have potentially changed the outcome of the decision on
enhancement. The limitation on the first factor of the Read test would
certainly change how the factor is weighed. In Dominion, there was not
actual evidence of the infringer copying the patent product.189 This is
the classic example of a case in which the court infers copying in a
situation where the infringer has simply been exposed to the patented
technology.190 Without more evidence of actual copying, the proposed
limitation would not allow the court to weigh this factor in favor of
enhancement because it is based on a theory of speculation—just
because an infringer could have had the opportunity to copy the
patented technology does not mean that it actually did.
The second and fifth factors overlap in this case, as they often do.191
In analyzing the second factor, there is no argument against the fact
that the infringer knew of the patent in question.192 Adopting the
187. See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ., 212 F. Supp. 3d at 257 (clarifying that although all nine
Read factors are helpful in the court’s enhancement analysis, the “touchstone” remains
the “egregiousness” of the infringer’s conduct). Another interesting limitation to
consider would be for the Supreme Court to adopt the commonly used analysis with
respect to the infringer providing samples of products or drawings. Such behavior often
weighs against enhancement, as explained in Section III, but analyzing how and when
this proposed limitation would be satisfied is beyond the scope of this Comment.
188. It is expected that the proposed limitations to the Read test will result in courts
granting enhancement in fewer cases. Nevertheless, it is important that courts still
punish the “wanton and malicious pirate” in cases of deliberate and “egregious”
infringement. To prove that this proposed limitation test functions as desired, it will
be applied to the Dominion and Imperium IP.
189. See Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *21.
190. Id.
191. See Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-02024-RMW, 2016 WL
4427490, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (conflating the second and fifth Read
factors in its enhancement analysis).
192. Dominion Res. Inc., 2016 WL 5674713, at *22.
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proposed limitations would prevent the court from weighing heavily
the infringer’s failure to seek professional opinions in favor of
enhancement. Without the ability to weigh that decision, all of the
other facts weigh in favor of no enhancement for factor two. Because
the infringer offered legitimate reasons as to why it believed it did not
infringe, factor two would now weigh against enhancement.193
Further, the court found factor five to be neutral, weighing in favor of
neither side.194 Nothing in the proposed limitations to the Read
analysis would change that factor.
With all of these factors now tipping towards no enhancement or
neutrality, the level of concealment as prescribed by the ninth factor
would have to be so drastic that it outweighs the fact that all of the
other factors have flipped sides. Applying the proposed limitations to
this factor would not change much. There is clear evidence of
concealment,195 and weighing this factor in favor of enhancement is
absolutely justified. That being said, the concealment is not so
egregious or drastic that it outweighs two of the other important. In
this case, it appears that, although the infringer engaged in some
questionable behavior, a court could reasonably apply the proposed
limitations to deny enhancement.196
Conversely, the proposed limitations to the Read test would most likely
leave the decision in Imperium IP as it stands. After analyzing the first
factor, it is clear that the proposed limitation would have no effect on the
decision to weigh this factor in favor of enhancement.197 The facts of this
case provided sound proof that agents of the infringer sought out
information about the patented technology before using that information
to copy.198 Applying the proposed limitation to the first Read factor would
not change the way a court would analyze these facts, and a reasonable
court would still find that this factor weighs in favor of enhancement.
Turning now to the second factor, the proposed limitations would
again result in no change to the outcome. The infringer knew of the

193. Id.
194. Id. at *23.
195. Id. at *22.
196. The egregious misconduct standard is in place to punish the most willful
infringers. Contrasting the infringer in Dominion with egregious infringers like the one
in Imperium IP makes clear that this is likely a case where enhancement is unwarranted.
197. Imperium IP Holdings (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 203 F. Supp. 3d
755, 763 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (referencing clear evidence of infringer’s copying), appeal
filed, No. 17-2133 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
198. Id. at 763.
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patents and even made attempts to purchase the patents before its
infringing activity.199 The court here noted that the infringer did not
seek legal counsel, but it seemed to base its decision more heavily on
the lack of the infringer to do anything to really understand the scope
of the patents after failed attempts to purchase the patents.200 The
proposed limitations do nothing to flip this factor to a decision of no
enhancement when the infringer does nothing to form its good faith
belief of non-infringement. Whether the infringer in Imperium IP
sought legal counsel does not change the fact that it did no internal
investigation to try to understand the metes and bounds of the
technology protected by the patent. The fifth factor is not analyzed in
the court’s opinion, but this does not seem to be a close case, at all.201
The limitations placed on the ninth factor do not help the infringer,
either. The infringer engaged in multiple instances of egregious conduct
in attempts to misrepresent the facts as well as hide evidence.202 The court
defined the misrepresentations made by the infringer as material, and the
evidence shows that the infringer failed to produce many of the requested
discovery documents.203 This type of concealment will always weigh in
favor of enhancement, and thus, the court’s decision would remain that
way had it applied the proposed test.
This case shows that the proposed limitations do not affect the lower
courts’ discretion to enhance damages in cases of extreme egregiousness.
More than other cases, the infringer in Imperium IP appears to be the type
of pirate that the Supreme Court intended to punish.
C. Policy Implications of Ignoring the Proposed Limitations
on District Court Discretion
In addition to its impact on willfulness litigation, the proposed
limitations to the Read factors would keep the quid pro quo scale of
patent law in balance. Although the Supreme Court obviously
considered the quid pro quo nature of patent law,204 it seems to have
199. Id. at 764.
200. Id.
201. See id. (listing the infringer’s multiple acts of willful concealment as well as trial
misconduct that resulted in court sanction prior to final judgment).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Douglas Nemec, Supreme Court, in Halo, Balances the Value of Patents and
Innovation, FORBES (June 27, 2016, 8:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2016/06/27/supreme-court-in-halo-balances-the-value-of-patents-andinnovation (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo).
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weighed more favorably for strengthening the patent and the limited
monopoly that comes with it. Although this may seem like a typical
holding meant to strengthen the value of the United States’ patent
system, the policy implications of such a holding may extend far
beyond what the Supreme Court intended.
The most troublesome result of the Halo decision would be a
scenario that gives non-practicing entities (NPEs), often referred to as
patent trolls, more incentive to file frivolous lawsuits against entities
that are trying to innovate.205 The common inventor and large
companies alike will be more likely to settle with the NPEs for fear of
reaching litigation and the possibility of enhanced damages.206 This
will result in exactly the imbalance described above. NPEs will send
demand or cease and desist letters at rates similar to those in a preSeagate patent world,207 leading to a frustration of the goals of the U.S.
Constitution; to “promote . . . Science and useful Arts.”208
Furthering this frustration is the best defense to NPEs in the court of
law. The best advice to a company facing demand letters from patent
trolls is to seek legal help.209 This compounds the extreme financial
burden already experienced during the inventive process. Thus,
potential infringers are left with three equally bad options: (1) settle
with the entity sending the demand letter; (2) spend money litigating—
an already expensive endeavor210—and potentially be held liable for

205. Chase Means, Has the Supreme Court Breathed New Life into Patent Trolls in Halo
and Stryker?, IPWATCHDOG (June 15, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/
06/15/supreme-court-patent-trolls-halo-stryker (discussing how the Halo decision may
impact the ability of patent trolls to receive larger settlements before going to litigation).
206. Id.
207. From 2004 to 2009, before the Federal Circuit’s Seagate decision, infringement
suits rose seventy percent, and demand letters requesting licensing fees rose
650 percent. Much of this increase in patent infringement activity was due to the
actions of NPEs.
See John Kelly, Are Patent Trolls Smothering Innovation?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS,
https://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/everyday-inno
vations/patent-trolls (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (analyzing the impact of patent trolls
on patent infringement litigation).
208. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. Kenneth Jeng et al., Litigating Willful Patent Infringement in a Post-Halo World,
IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/08/litigatingwillful-patent-infringement-post-halo (discussing strategies for avoiding egregious
conduct before litigation).
210. See generally James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent
Litigation, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 60 (2012) (analyzing the financial and businessrelated costs of patent infringement litigation).
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enhanced damages; or (3) abandon its innovative work.211 Most
common inventors and technology start-ups do not have the money to
fund the litigation, so it results in a strong stifling of innovation.212
Although strengthening the value of a patent is understandably
important, it should not be done at the expense of innovation. As it
stands, the Supreme Court’s decision in Halo does just that. In a quid
pro quo system meant to further scientific development in the United
States, promoting innovation should not take a back seat to financial
return for patent owners.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Halo loosened the standards for
enhanced damages in patent law. In doing so, the Court struck down
the Federal Circuit’s Seagate two-part test and replaced it with the
egregious misconduct test. The egregious misconduct test left lower
courts with the discretion to award enhanced damages as they saw fit.
Currently, district courts often rely on the nine factors of the Read test
to analyze questions of willfulness in patent infringement lawsuits.
Further, the Court should have recognized that lower courts would
likely rely on the Read factors to analyze willfulness and improperly use
their discretion to award enhanced damages too frequently. As Justice
Breyer acknowledges in his concurring opinion in Halo, the Court
should have used its power to place limitations on the discretion of the
district courts. Although the Court’s decision to strike down the Seagate
test is grounded in sound legal analysis, the proposed limitations
described in this Comment are necessary to ensure that the egregious
misconduct test accomplishes the intended goal of the Court—to
punish the “wanton and malicious pirate.”
Finally, the proposed limitations to the Read test allow more patent
infringers to evade enhanced damages while punishing only the most
willful infringers. Using enhanced damages in this manor ensures that
the quid pro quo balance that has served as the foundation of patent law
does not tip too far in favor of the patent holder at the expense of the
promotion of innovation.

211. Reports show that ninety-seven percent of patent infringement suits settle
before litigation. See Kelly, supra note 207.
212. Sometimes smaller companies choose to fight patent trolls and, often, win the
lawsuit. See, e.g., Gil Elbaz, Beating Back the Trolls: Repealing a Major Tax on Innovation,
NEWCO SHIFT (Apr. 20, 2016), https://shift.newco.co/beating-back-the-patent-trolls
(telling the story of how a company fought back against an NPE).

